We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving a moral hazard: sellers can either faithfully deliver goods after receiving payment, or not. Although the buyer does not know a seller's true type, the platform maintains a reputation system that probabilistically assigns binary reputation signals. Buyers make purchase decisions based on reputation signals, which influence the payoffs to sellers who then adapt their type over time. These market dynamics ultimately shape the platform's profit from commissions on sales. Our analysis reveals that platforms inherently have an incentive for rating inflation, driven by the desire to increase commission. This introduces a second layer of moral hazard: the platform's incentive to distort reputations for its own profit. Such distortion is self-limited by the platform's need to maintain enough accuracy that trustworthy sellers remain in the market, without which rational buyers would refrain from purchases altogether. Nonetheless, the optimal strategy for the platform can be to invest in order to reduce signal accuracy. When the platform can freely set commission fees, however, maximum profit may be achieved by costly investment in an accurate reputation system. These findings highlight the intricate tensions between platform incentives and resulting social utility for marketplace participants.

Abstract--Recent advances in machine learning and big data analytics have intensified the demand for high-quality cross-domain datasets and accelerated the growth of data trading across organizations. As data become increasingly recognized as an economic asset, data marketplaces have emerged as a key infrastructure for data-driven innovation. However, unlike mature product or service markets, data-trading environments remain nascent and suffer from pronounced information asymmetry. Buyers cannot verify the content or quality before purchasing data, making trust and quality assurance central challenges. T o address these issues, this study develops a multi-agent data-market simulator that models participant behavior and evaluates the institutional mechanisms for trust formation. Focusing on the manufacturing sector, where initiatives such as GAIA-X and Catena-X are advancing, the simulator integrates reinforcement learning (RL) for adaptive agent behavior and inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) to estimate utility functions from empirical behavioral data. Using the simulator, we examine the market-level effects of five representative reputation systems--Time-decay, Bayesian-beta, PageRank, PowerTrust, and PeerTrust--and found that PeerTrust achieved the strongest alignment between data price and quality, while preventing monopolistic dominance. Building on these results, we develop a hybrid reputation mechanism that integrates the strengths of existing systems to achieve improved price-quality consistency and overall market stability. This study extends simulation-based data-market analysis by incorporating trust and reputation as endogenous mechanisms and offering methodological and institutional insights into the design of reliable and efficient data ecosystems.

Online ratings influence customer decision-making, yet standard aggregation methods, such as the sample mean, fail to adapt to quality changes over time and ignore review heterogeneity (e.g., review sentiment, a review's helpfulness). To address these challenges, we demonstrate the value of using the Gaussian process (GP) framework for rating aggregation. Specifically, we present a tailored GP model that captures the dynamics of ratings over time while additionally accounting for review heterogeneity. Based on 121,123 ratings from Yelp, we compare the predictive power of different rating aggregation methods in predicting future ratings, thereby finding that the GP model is considerably more accurate and reduces the mean absolute error by 10.2% compared to the sample mean. Our findings have important implications for marketing practitioners and customers. By moving beyond means, designers of online reputation systems can display more informative and adaptive aggregated rating scores that are accurate signals of expected customer satisfaction.

The meteoric rise of AI, with its rapidly expanding market capitalization, presents both transformative opportunities and critical challenges. Chief among these is the urgent need for a new, unified paradigm for trustworthy evaluation, as current benchmarks increasingly reveal critical vulnerabilities. Issues like data contamination and selective reporting by model developers fuel hype, while inadequate data quality control can lead to biased evaluations that, even if unintentionally, may favor specific approaches. As a flood of participants enters the AI space, this "Wild West" of assessment makes distinguishing genuine progress from exaggerated claims exceptionally difficult. Such ambiguity blurs scientific signals and erodes public confidence, much as unchecked claims would destabilize financial markets reliant on credible oversight from agencies like Moody's. In high-stakes human examinations (e.g., SAT, GRE), substantial effort is devoted to ensuring fairness and credibility; why settle for less in evaluating AI, especially given its profound societal impact? This position paper argues that the current laissez-faire approach is unsustainable. We contend that true, sustainable AI advancement demands a paradigm shift: a unified, live, and quality-controlled benchmarking framework robust by construction, not by mere courtesy and goodwill. To this end, we dissect the systemic flaws undermining today's AI evaluation, distill the essential requirements for a new generation of assessments, and introduce PeerBench (with its prototype implementation at https://www.peerbench.ai/), a community-governed, proctored evaluation blueprint that embodies this paradigm through sealed execution, item banking with rolling renewal, and delayed transparency. Our goal is to pave the way for evaluations that can restore integrity and deliver genuinely trustworthy measures of AI progress.

We investigate how a blockchain can distill the collective belief of its nodes regarding the trustworthiness of a (sub)set of nodes into a {\em reputation system} that reflects the probability of correctly performing a task. To address this question, we introduce a framework that breaks it down into two sub-problems: 1. (Information Extraction): How can the system distill trust information from a function of the nodes' true beliefs? 2. (Incentive Design): How can we incentivize nodes to truthfully report such information? To tackle the first sub-problem, we adapt, in a non-trivial manner, the well-known PageRank algorithm to our problem. For the second, we define a new class of games, called Trustworthy Reputation games (TRep games), which aim to extract the collective beliefs on trust from the actions of rational participants. We then propose a concrete TRep game whose utility function leverages Personalized PageRank and can be instantiated through a straightforward blockchain rewards mechanism. Building on this, we show how the TRep game enables the design of a reputation system. Such systems can enhance the robustness, scalability, and efficiency of blockchain and DeFi solutions. For instance, we demonstrate how such a system can be used within a Proof-of-Reputation blockchain.

Blockchain consensus, rooted in the principle ``don't trust, verify'', limits access to real-world data, which may be ambiguous or inaccessible to some participants. Oracles address this limitation by supplying data to blockchains, but existing solutions may reduce autonomy, transparency, or reintroduce the need for trust. We propose Swarm Oracle: a decentralized network of autonomous robots -- that is, a robot swarm -- that use onboard sensors and peer-to-peer communication to collectively verify real-world data and provide it to smart contracts on public blockchains. Swarm Oracle leverages the built-in decentralization, fault tolerance and mobility of robot swarms, which can flexibly adapt to meet information requests on-demand, even in remote locations. Unlike typical cooperative robot swarms, Swarm Oracle integrates robots from multiple stakeholders, protecting the system from single-party biases but also introducing potential adversarial behavior. To ensure the secure, trustless and global consensus required by blockchains, we employ a Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol that enables robots from different stakeholders to operate together, reaching social agreements of higher quality than the estimates of individual robots. Through extensive experiments using both real and simulated robots, we showcase how consensus on uncertain environmental information can be achieved, despite several types of attacks orchestrated by large proportions of the robots, and how a reputation system based on blockchain tokens lets Swarm Oracle autonomously recover from faults and attacks, a requirement for long-term operation.

Analyzing social media trends can create a win-win situation for both creators and consumers. Creators can receive fair compensation, while consumers gain access to engaging, relevant, and personalized content. This paper proposes a new model for analyzing Bitcoin trends on Twitter by incorporating a 'liquid democracy' approach based on user reputation. This system aims to identify the most impactful trends and their influence on Bitcoin prices and trading volume. It uses a Twitter sentiment analysis model based on a reputation rating system to determine the impact on Bitcoin price change and traded volume. In addition, the reputation model considers the users' higher-order friends on the social network (the initial Twitter input channels in our case study) to improve the accuracy and diversity of the reputation results. We analyze Bitcoin-related news on Twitter to understand how trends and user sentiment, measured through our Liquid Rank Reputation System, affect Bitcoin price fluctuations and trading activity within the studied time frame. This reputation model can also be used as an additional layer in other trend and sentiment analysis models. The paper proposes the implementation, challenges, and future scope of the liquid rank reputation model.

Open multi-agent systems (MAS) are composed of agents under different organisational control, and whose internal goals and mental states cannot be observed. In such systems, agents often have differing capabilities, and must rely on each other when pursuing their goals, making task delegation commonplace. This delegation occurs when one agent (the delegator) requests that another (the delegatee), execute a task. A fundamental problem faced by the delegator involves selecting the most appropriate delegatee to whom the task should be delegated, and a significant body of work centred around trust and reputation systems has examined how such a delegation decision should take place [6, 12, 13]. At their heart, trust and reputation systems associate a rating with each potential delegatee, and select who to delegate a task to based on this rating. Following task execution, the rating is updated based on how well the task was completed. Different systems compute the ratings differently, for example incorporating indirect information from other agents in the system [8, 14], or utilising social and cognitive concepts as part of the computation process [4]. Trust and reputation systems can also differ in the way they select a delegatee, for example by using the rating to weigh the likelihood of selection. While trust and reputation systems seek to satisfy many properties including resistance to different types of attacks by malicious agents [7], at their heart, they balance the exploration of delegatee behaviour with the exploitation of high quality delagatees.

Problem of reliable democratic governance is critical for survival of any community, and it will be critical for communities powered with Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems upon developments of the latter. Apparently, it will be getting more and more critical because of increasing speeds and scales of electronic communications and decreasing latencies in system responses. In order to address this need, we present design and implementation of a reputation system supporting "liquid democracy" principle. The system is based on "weighted liquid rank" algorithm employing different sorts of explicit and implicit ratings being exchanged by members of the society as well as implicit assessments of of the members based on measures of their activity in the society. The system is evaluated against live social network data with help of simulation modelling for an online marketplace case.

We simulate a reputation system in a market to optimise the balance between market security and market equity. We introduce a method of using a reputation system that will stabilise the distribution of wealth in a market in a fair manner. We also introduce metrics of a modified Gini that takes production quality into account, a way to use a weighted Pearson as a tool to optimise balance.